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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 28, 2010 21:27:00 GMT
But how about (for example) a terrorist website that incites people to go out and plant bombs? That site may influence people who don't even know each other to go out and separately commit bombings. That would surely make the terrorist website responsible for their actions as well as the individual bombers? Common purpose is very hard to define in practice sometimes. of course the terrorist website is totally responsible for ANY act committed by anyone who acts at their urging. it is not necessary for there to be personal contact in order for a conspiracy such as this to exist.
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Post by randomvioce on Jan 28, 2010 21:39:02 GMT
well hon, who is, or is not the leader, is irrelevant. ALL members of the conspiracy are equally guilty. the getaway driver is just as guilty as the mastermind. both of them conspired to commit a crime in which someone died, so obviously, both are equally guilty of murder. it really max nix what bentley said, or what anyone thought he meant. Not rue, the QC has to prove that the defendent knew that the person was carrying a weapon and was likely to use it.
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Post by randomvioce on Jan 28, 2010 21:56:29 GMT
wrong lad. you are claiming that he can't be held responsible for any crime that he incites once he's been arrested. that's virtually verbatim from you How many more times? If this man incites a riot, then he HAS committed a crime, irrespective of whether or not a riot occurs. He will be charged with such an offence and evidence gathered for a trial. He is never actually responsible for the actions of the crowd, prior to or after the arrest! He is not in a common enterprise with them because he has not planned anything with them. If he and three mate decide to set fire to the local Tescos, but they are arrested before the fire. Then all three will be charged, subject to evidence, with conspicacy to cause fire. If one of the four throw a petrol bomb and it kills somebody, all four will be charged with murder or manslaughter, because they are part of a common enterprise If he is arrested BEFORE the petrol bomb was thrown then he will still be guilty of conspircacy, but because he is in police custody he will cease to be part of the common enterprise. He will, of course be an accessory to murder/fire raising depending on his invovlement.
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Post by randomvioce on Jan 28, 2010 22:00:08 GMT
That would surely make the terrorist website responsible for their actions as well as the individual bombers? Difficult that one, Lin. If 30,000 Celtic fans sing about the IRA killing the Queen are they inciting murder? Or do Rangers fans have a case to answer if the pope suffers from an attack of buggery?
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 29, 2010 0:39:18 GMT
well hon, who is, or is not the leader, is irrelevant. ALL members of the conspiracy are equally guilty. the getaway driver is just as guilty as the mastermind. both of them conspired to commit a crime in which someone died, so obviously, both are equally guilty of murder. it really max nix what bentley said, or what anyone thought he meant. Not rue, the QC has to prove that the defendent knew that the person was carrying a weapon and was likely to use it. i doubt that is the case, but, of course, if it is, it is another illustration of the absolute absurdity of british law. in the u.s., we're more rational than that
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Post by randomvioce on Jan 29, 2010 0:50:16 GMT
Not rue, the QC has to prove that the defendent knew that the person was carrying a weapon and was likely to use it. i doubt that is the case, but, of course, if it is, it is another illustration of the absolute absurdity of british law. in the u.s., we're more rational than that en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_purposeWhere one of the participants deliberately departs from the common purpose by doing something that was not authorised or agreed upon, they alone are liable for the consequences. In the situation exemplified in Davies v DPP (1954) AC 378 a group comes together for a fight or to commit a crime and either they know or do not know that one of their team has a weapon. If they know that there is a weapon, it is foreseeable that it might be used and the fact that the other participants do not instruct the one carrying to leave it behind, means that its use must be within the scope of their intention. But if they do not know of the weapon, this is a deliberate departure from the common purpose and this breaks the enterprise.If the gang agree to use loaded guns (or a gun) then they are all guilty of any murder commited by any member of a gang. If someone pulls a gun that the rest of the gang had no knowledge of then he had broken the enterprise. There are stories that before a crime gang went out on a robbery etc, they would search each other for guns, because of this part of the law.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 29, 2010 6:45:07 GMT
The Court of Appeal in 1998 helpfully gave us chapter and verse on this: Bentley, crucially, was carrying both a knife and a knuckle duster.
****************************************************
"84) It seems to us, in the light of those authorities binding on the trial judge, that his direction to the jury was in accordance with the law as it then stood and was, if anything, favourable to the appellant. But it was argued that later developments in the law governing the liability of secondary parties to joint criminal enterprises, in particular the recent decision of the House of Lords in R v Powell and R v English [1997] 3 WLR 959, rendered his direction unsound. The relevant law is in our judgment summarised with sufficient accuracy for present purposes in the following propositions advanced on behalf of the Crown: i) Where two parties embark on a joint enterprise to commit a crime and one party foresees that in the course of the enterprise the other party may carry out, with the requisite mens rea, an act constituting another crime, the former is liable for that crime if committed by the latter in the course of the enterprise (R v Smith [1963] 1 WLR 1200; Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168; R v Powell and R v English, above; R v Uddin and others (Court of Appeal), 19 March 1998. ii) Where the principal kills with a deadly weapon, which the secondary party did not know that he had and of which he therefore did not foresee use by the principal, the secondary party is not guilty of murder.
iii) If the weapon used by the primary party is different to but as dangerous as the weapon which the secondary party contemplated he might use, the secondary party should not escape liability for murder because of the difference in the weapon, for example if he foresaw that the primary party might use a gun to kill and the latter used a knife to kill or vice versa (R v English, above at 981B - C per Lord Hutton).
iv) The secondary party is subject to criminal liability if he contemplated the act causing the death as a possible incident of the joint venture unless the risk was so remote that the jury take the view that the secondary party genuinely dismissed it as altogether negligible (R v English, above, at 981C-D).
85) Even if we undertake the anachronistic exercise of applying those principles to the trial judge’s direction to the jury in 1952, the soundness of that direction is not in our view invalidated. Nothing in his direction suggested that the appellant could be liable if he did not know that Craig had a gun, nor did he suggest that the appellant could be liable if he did not foresee the use of the gun. His direction was founded on the premise of an agreement between the appellant and Craig to use such violence as might be necessary to avoid arrest: this would plainly embrace use of the gun, even if the appellant did not intend that the gun should be fired, or fired so as to cause injury, and did not expect the gun to be fired unless the firing was regarded by the appellant as a wholly remote possibility. On the basis of the law of constructive malice as it then stood, and the law of joint enterprise as it now stands, the trial judge’s direction in the passages we have quoted was in our judgment correct. "
**************************************************** (as I said earlier, Bentley's convition was quashed for other reasons)
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 29, 2010 12:45:22 GMT
i doubt that is the case, but, of course, if it is, it is another illustration of the absolute absurdity of british law. in the u.s., we're more rational than that en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_purposeWhere one of the participants deliberately departs from the common purpose by doing something that was not authorised or agreed upon, they alone are liable for the consequences. In the situation exemplified in Davies v DPP (1954) AC 378 a group comes together for a fight or to commit a crime and either they know or do not know that one of their team has a weapon. If they know that there is a weapon, it is foreseeable that it might be used and the fact that the other participants do not instruct the one carrying to leave it behind, means that its use must be within the scope of their intention. But if they do not know of the weapon, this is a deliberate departure from the common purpose and this breaks the enterprise.If the gang agree to use loaded guns (or a gun) then they are all guilty of any murder commited by any member of a gang. If someone pulls a gun that the rest of the gang had no knowledge of then he had broken the enterprise. There are stories that before a crime gang went out on a robbery etc, they would search each other for guns, because of this part of the law. if for no other reason, such an idea is stupid since obviously, who of the other gang members is going to acknowledge knowing that one had a gun? the most rational law is that of texas: Section 7.02 of the Texas Penal Code outlines the following: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense he solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other persons to commit the offense" or "If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy." of course, the most intelligent section here is: all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose if you are not committing a robbery, you don't have to worry about anything. if you are so worthless that you do, it is only morally right that you have to worry about EVERYTHING
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 29, 2010 12:51:47 GMT
The Court of Appeal in 1998 helpfully gave us chapter and verse on this: Bentley, crucially, was carrying both a knife and a knuckle duster. **************************************************** "84) It seems to us, in the light of those authorities binding on the trial judge, that his direction to the jury was in accordance with the law as it then stood and was, if anything, favourable to the appellant. But it was argued that later developments in the law governing the liability of secondary parties to joint criminal enterprises, in particular the recent decision of the House of Lords in R v Powell and R v English [1997] 3 WLR 959, rendered his direction unsound. The relevant law is in our judgment summarised with sufficient accuracy for present purposes in the following propositions advanced on behalf of the Crown: i) Where two parties embark on a joint enterprise to commit a crime and one party foresees that in the course of the enterprise the other party may carry out, with the requisite mens rea, an act constituting another crime, the former is liable for that crime if committed by the latter in the course of the enterprise (R v Smith [1963] 1 WLR 1200; Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168; R v Powell and R v English, above; R v Uddin and others (Court of Appeal), 19 March 1998. ii) Where the principal kills with a deadly weapon, which the secondary party did not know that he had and of which he therefore did not foresee use by the principal, the secondary party is not guilty of murder. iii) If the weapon used by the primary party is different to but as dangerous as the weapon which the secondary party contemplated he might use, the secondary party should not escape liability for murder because of the difference in the weapon, for example if he foresaw that the primary party might use a gun to kill and the latter used a knife to kill or vice versa (R v English, above at 981B - C per Lord Hutton). iv) The secondary party is subject to criminal liability if he contemplated the act causing the death as a possible incident of the joint venture unless the risk was so remote that the jury take the view that the secondary party genuinely dismissed it as altogether negligible (R v English, above, at 981C-D). 85) Even if we undertake the anachronistic exercise of applying those principles to the trial judge’s direction to the jury in 1952, the soundness of that direction is not in our view invalidated. Nothing in his direction suggested that the appellant could be liable if he did not know that Craig had a gun, nor did he suggest that the appellant could be liable if he did not foresee the use of the gun. His direction was founded on the premise of an agreement between the appellant and Craig to use such violence as might be necessary to avoid arrest: this would plainly embrace use of the gun, even if the appellant did not intend that the gun should be fired, or fired so as to cause injury, and did not expect the gun to be fired unless the firing was regarded by the appellant as a wholly remote possibility. On the basis of the law of constructive malice as it then stood, and the law of joint enterprise as it now stands, the trial judge’s direction in the passages we have quoted was in our judgment correct. " **************************************************** (as I said earlier, Bentley's convition was quashed for other reasons) at least it's a good thing that such an insane nonissue did not result in the conviction being quashed. to even try to challenge the trial judge's actions in light of laws that didn't exist at the time is prima facie imbecillic, and no ground for appeal to begin with. every case has to be decided in light of the law at the time of the offence, even if the trial is held twenty years later. simply because time passes between the commission of the crime and the arrest and trial, does NOT give the criminal any rights to have a lesser sentence, or anything else, if the law has been changed in the meantime
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Post by Deleted on Jan 29, 2010 16:52:37 GMT
The really worrying thing is that I keep agreeing with Jumbo on this thread.
Perhpas I need to lie down in a darkened room.
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 29, 2010 18:47:47 GMT
The really worrying thing is that I keep agreeing with Jumbo on this thread. Perhpas I need to lie down in a darkened room. i'm pretty sure that you have tylenol in britain. perhaps you should lay in a supply. doesn't it feel good being on the right side though?
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Post by Deleted on Jan 29, 2010 19:27:27 GMT
doesn't it feel good being on the right side though? What a coincidence! I was thinking of asking you the same. ;D
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 29, 2010 20:37:39 GMT
doesn't it feel good being on the right side though? What a coincidence! I was thinking of asking you the same. ;D well hon, i'll save you the trouble. of course it does. that's why i always feel finer than frog's hair
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Post by Deleted on Jan 30, 2010 6:13:11 GMT
Well, I'll admit to agreeing with you about the absurdity of judging a 40 year old case in the light of the law now. I think we are probably vaguely as one over whether arrest ends common purpose.
But I'm happy to leave you to your frog's hair over most other things, Jumbo!
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 30, 2010 10:37:50 GMT
Well, I'll admit to agreeing with you about the absurdity of judging a 40 year old case in the light of the law now. I think we are probably vaguely as one over whether arrest ends common purpose. But I'm happy to leave you to your frog's hair over most other things, Jumbo! that's what makes the world go 'round, and why you should probably have a good supply of tylenol
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Post by Deleted on Jan 30, 2010 14:28:41 GMT
Mr Google tells me tylenol is a painkiller - what a let down! I thought it must be a tranquilliser drug or summat!
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Post by iamjumbo on Jan 30, 2010 16:05:02 GMT
Mr Google tells me tylenol is a painkiller - what a let down! I thought it must be a tranquilliser drug or summat! yeah, it is. it has been quite useful for several folks who have experienced headaches caused by having to agree with me it shouldn't get so bad that a tranquilizer is required
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